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which had fixed the basic market
structure of the Japanese airline
industry in the 1970s, was called
collectively the “Aviation Consti-
tution” in all.
The regulatory framework un-
der the Constitution collapsed in
the mid-80s under the worldwide
trend toward deregulation. Each
airline was permitted to enter into
any market provided a suitable li-
cense was granted. But this was a
marginal policy change, that did
not mean the Japanese sky was lib-
eralized. The Ministry has, in ef-
fect, discouraged competition by
applying the “demand-supply ad-
justment clauses” and price regu-
lation even after the Constitution
was lifted. New entry and price
competition have been severely re-
stricted.
3. NOMINAL DEREGULATION
IN 2000
The strict regulations were not
changed until the mid 90s, when
there emerged a strong call for lib-
eralization of airfares under the
strong administrative reform
movement. Public support for set-
ting up new airlines to challenge
the tight domestic market in No-
vember 1996 put strong pressure
on the MoT. The Ministry finally
accepted the recommendation of
the Administrative Reform Com-
mittee and declared they would lift
the long-standing demand-supply
adjustment clauses by April 2000.
However, my experience
with the Ministry of Transport tells
me that liberalizing the transport
The Japanese sky was “de-
regulated” this April, but the regu-
latory situation will not be change.
The notorious “demand-sup-
ply adjustment clauses” of the
Civil Aviation Act, which re-
stricted competition in Japanese air
transport markets for nearly 50
years, were lifted this April. These
clauses gave the Ministry of Trans-
port (MoT) the power to determine
who should operate any particular
route and the level of service to
be provided. Price, too, was under
the strict control of the Ministry.
Prior to the policy change,
two new independent domestic air-
lines were established in Japan, for
the first time in a half-century, in
1996. The new entrants began lim-
ited service on several routes in
1998. But the new comers, as well
as the incumbents, stand still be-
cause of tough regulation by the
Ministry. The regulatory ministry
resists any real elimination of the
regulations that they govern.
1. MARKET STRUCTURE
The air transport market in
Japan is not so small considering
the size of the country. The total
number of revenue passengers in
the domestic market is one-sixth
that of the US market. The three
big airlines: Japan Airlines (JAL),
All Nippon Airways (ANA) and
Japan Air System (JAS) and their
subsidiaries dominate the market.
There are several independent air-
lines but except for the two re-
cently established independents,
most of them are commuter class
airlines serving islands and other
remote areas.
2. SHORT HISTORY OF STRICT
ECONOMIC REGULATION
Air transport policy in Japan
has been very conservative. Entry
and pricing have been regulated
tightly by the MoT, though some
changes were made in the last de-
cade to give the false impression
that the MoT was aiming to in-
crease competition. Room for ef-
fective competition among carriers
has been very restricted.
Just after the World War II,
the Allied Forces banned commer-
cial aviation in Japan, and it was
not until 1951 that Japanese air-
lines were allowed to commence
their own services. A number of
airlines were established in the 50s
and 60s, but as a result of mergers
and /or Government initiatives
only three groups survived by the
70s.
The Cabinet Meeting Resolu-
tion Concerning Airline Operations
in 1970 suggested that commer-
cial aviation in Japan should be
operated by the three airlines: JAL,
ANA and TDA (the former name
of JAS), and their associates. In
1972, the Transport Minister an-
nounced the Notice Regarding Air-
line Operations, which gave JAL
international business and domes-
tic trunk routes, ANA short-dis-
tance international charters and
domestic operations, and TDA do-
mestic regional services and some
trunk services. The above “Cabinet
Meeting Resolution” and “Notice
from the Minister of Transport”,
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industry will not be an easy task. I
remain skeptical about how seri-
ous the Ministry of Transport is
about deregulation.
The Ministry has declared
they will liberalize but only if suf-
ficient airport landing slots are
available at crowded airports. Ap-
proximately sixty percent of do-
mestic flights are from Tokyo
Haneda airport, where landing
slots are limited artificially by the
Ministry. According to the ratio-
nale of the Ministry, liberalization
cannot take place with the current
limited landing slots. Landing slots
at the airport can, however, be in-
creased by 30 or 40% without ex-
pansion of the airport through
efforts such as improving the air
traffic control system. The Minis-
try artificially restricts landing
slots in order to control airlines
through its control over their dis-
tribution. Then the Ministry of
Transport says they have no choice
but to preclude free competition.
In fact, the Ministry reguired
that specific routes be maintained,
regardless of the will of the air-
lines, when they distributed addi-
tional landing slots accompanying
the opening of a new cross run-
way this March. It must be pointed
out that landing slots should be dis-
tributed by a system such as a ten-
der system, which allows no
discretion by the regulatory min-
istry. Also, a shake-up in the
nation’s bureaucracy is a pre-req-
uisite for any degree of progress
in deregulation given the close ties
bureaucrats have with industries
and vested interests.
A synthetic approach of regu-
lation is also needed to encourage
new entrants. It is very difficult
for new comers to enter into the
Japanese domestic market as al-
most all resources (including hu-
man resources and airport facilities
such as landing slots and boarding
bridges) are under control of the
Big Three. Next to the landing
slots, maintenance capacity is the
most critical matter for new com-
ers at Haneda airport if all me-
chanical facilities are under control
of the Big Three. New entrants
cannot maintain services if the ex-
isting big carriers quit maintenance
work for the new entrants. The Fair
Trade Commission should act ag-
gressively to intervene in the mar-
ket to ensure that the oligopolistic
power of the Big Three is not
abused. Also, some premium for
new entrants is needed, such as
preferential distribution of landing
slots, to encourage them. Liberal-
ization of the Japanese sky is just
getting started.
Photo 1 A newly established independent, Skymark Airlines, is in ambitious livery but stands still Japanese tough
regulation
